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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process-Right
To Counsel At College Disciplinary Hearings
The plaintiffs were students at Bluefield State College, a state
supported institution, operated by and under the control and supervision of the West Virginia Board of Education. The plaintiffs
planned a student protest demonstration to begin during the halftime of a football game. The demonstration was peaceful in the
beginning but subsequently became violent to the extent that the
president of the college was in danger of bodily injury. The president thereafter attempted to locate the students for purposes of a
personal conference, but was unable to do so. He then mailed
suspension letters to each of them and notified their parents by
telegram. In the letters, the plaintiffs were advised of the reasons
for the action, their right to an appeal hearing, and the appropriate
method of requesting one. Six of the ten plaintiffs appeared before
the Faculty Committee on Student Affairs and, upon the refusal of
their request to be represented by legal counsel, they read a prepared statement and refused to continue with the hearing. The
remaining four plaintiffs appeared and had a hearing. Thereafter,
on two separate occasions, the Committee extended further opportunities for a hearing to the six remaining plaintiffs, but none
appeared.
Plaintiffs brought this action in the Federal District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia to enjoin defendants from
continuing to enforce the suspension. Held, plaintiffs' denial of
reinstatement affirmed. The students were not entitled to legal
representation before the Committee. The proceedings satisfied
the requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp 228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968),
aff'd, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968).
I. DuE

PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN COLLEGE DISCIPLINARY
HEAINGS

Although the issue of college student dismissals is not new,
the issue of procedural due process in college disciplinary hearings
is a relatively young but developing area of the law. As early as
1891 the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the power of the university to dismiss any student for disciplinary reasons. In so ruling
the Illinois court employed the theory which has prevailed until
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recently, i.e., by voluntarily entering a college or university of his
choice a student necessarily surrenders many individual rights which
otherwise would be protected by the Constitution.' Utilizing this
theory, the courts refused to overrule the decisions of college officials unless there was a clear showing of abuse of discretion,
such as arbitrary or capricious action.2 It is generally recognized
today that school authorities have the right to define offenses for
which a student may be expelled, to determine whether the offense
has been committed, and to exercise broad discretionary power in
student discipline. 3 However, it is increasingly recognized that this
discretionary power is not unlimited.4
Until recently it was thought that student disciplinary proceedings
at a state, tax-supported college could not be brought within the
protection of procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment. State ex reL Sherman v. Hyman5 denied the appliciability
of the fourteenth amendment to student disciplinary proceedings
at a state-supported institution. The court held that no issue of
due process is raised where the university "is rightfully exercising its
inherent authority to discipline students." 6
Whether the right to remain in college is a constitutionally protected right was considered in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education.7 This case involved students who were expelled from Alabama
State University on the grounds of conduct unbecoming a student
because they participated in a racial demonstration at a lunch grill
which refused to serve Negroes. The court recognized "that the
right to remain at the college in which the plaintiffs were students
in good standing is an interest of extremely great value."' Furthermore "there must be some reasonable constitutional ground for
North v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill.,
137 Il1. 296, 306, 27 N.E.
54, 56 (1891).
2 Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 288 (D. Colo. 1968); Zanders
v. La. St. Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 769 (W.D. La. 1968); Goldberg
v. Regents of U. of Calif., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 473 (1st D.C.A. 1967).
Cornette v. Aldridge, 408 S.W.2d 935, 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
At page 942 the court said:
It is difficult to imagine a period in the life of our nation when the
courts need to give greater support to public school authorities concerning
their discretion in dealing with students than now, so long as such discretion is not exercised in an unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious
manner.
4 Dixon v. Ala. St. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
' 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748
(1943).
6 180 Tenn. at 111, 171 S.W.2d at 827.
87294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
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expulsion or the courts would have a duty to require reinstatement." 9 In Knight v. State Board of Education'" the court stated
that Dixon expressly rejected the theory that one's interest in
remaining in college was a mere privilege" and indicated that
any attempt to distinguish between a privilege and a right is a "mere
play upon words."' 2
The Dixon case specifically held "that due process requires notice
and some opportunity for hearing before a student at a tax-supported
college is expelled for misconduct."' 3 However, the problem left
unsolved by the Dixon case is a determination of precisely what
type of hearing will satisfy the requirements of due process. 4 The
format suggested by Dixon merely provides a forum in which the
student may present his side of the dispute, with no corresponding
provision for the right to have an attorney present to advise him,
to cross-examine witnesses or to present rebuttal evidence.'
II. RIGHT To COUNSEL IN COLLEGE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

The right to counsel is not an essential element of a fair hearing
in all types of college disciplinary proceedings.' 6 It would seem
desirable to limit the right to counsel to those circumstances in
which the student may be expelled or suspended for one term
or more for disciplinary reasons. The crucial problem is to find
a proper balance between the school's interest in establishing disciplinary rules for the protection of the institution and the student's
valuable interest in not being arbitrarily deprived of educational

opportunities."
In determining whether students should have the right to counsel
at disciplinary hearings, one can compare the interests involved
9

1d.

i0200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
Id. at 178. "Private interests are to be evaluated under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment not in terms of labels or fictions, but
in terms
of their true significance had worth."
2
1 Id.

13 Dixon v. Ala. St. Bd. of Educ.,
'4 The court in Dixon said:

294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961).

In such circumstances, a hearing which gives the Board or the administrative authorities of the college an opportunity to hear both sides in
considerable detail is best suited to protect the rights of all involved.
Id. at 159.
'5Note, Due Process in Public Colleges and Universities: Need for
Trial-Type Hearings, 13 How. L.J. 414, 417 (1967).
16 Madera v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 786 (2d Cir. 1967). This case
involved a junior high school guidance counseling session in which the
parents,
acting on behalf of the child, were denied the right to counsel.
'7 Note, Expulsion of College and Professional Students-Rights and
Remedies, 38 NoTRE DAME LAwYER 174 (1963).
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with analogous situations where this right has been upheld. For
instance, the right to counsel is granted to persons accused of misdemeanors. Standards set out by courts to insure fair hearings at
both the judicial and administrative levels have included the right
to counsel. In Bolkovac v. State"8 the court observed that the right
to counsel exists in misdemeanor causes to the same extent that it
applies to felony cases. Since the punishment of a misdemeanant
may involve a fine only, it would seem unreasonable to deprive a
student of the right to counsel when the student stands to lose
a college education which is considerably more valuable than the
mere loss of money. By the mere phrasing of the notice of dismissal
on a student's transcript, the school can make it virtually impossible
for this student to gain admission elsewhere.' 9 It has been suggested
that the right to a hearing, in order to meet the constitutional standards of fairness, requires the right to counsel, if desired.2"
In Almon v. Morgan County"' the Alabama Suppreme Court
discussed the elements of procedural due process necessary to
meet the requirements of fair play, whether in a court or an administrative hearing. Included in these elements were notice of
an open hearing before a legally constituted court or other authority,
an opportunity to present evidence and argument, the right to
counsel, if desired, and information concerning the allegations of
the opposing party.22 Another 1944 decision23 stated that a proper
hearing included reasonable notice of the offense charged, an opportunity for one to face his accusers and hear their testimony,
submission of evidence in his own behalf, and the right to be
represented by counsel, if desired.2 4 Considering the present disposition to deny students the right to counsel at a college disciplinary
hearing, as indicated in the Barker case, it seems that due process
may have suffered a set back in the area of student rights.
18229 Ind. 294, 98 N.E.2d 250 (1951). See also W. VA. CODE ch. 62,
art. 3, § 1 (Michie Supp. 1968) which specifically provides for the right to
counsel in misdemeanor cases and for the court appointment and payment of
such counsel in cases of indigent misdemeants.
19See Note, Private Government on the Campus-Judicial Review of
University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1365 (1963).
20 46 N.C.L. Rnv. 398, 403 (1968).
21 245 Ala. 241, 16 So. 2d 511 (1944).

22 Id. at 246, 16 So. 2d at 515.
2, Geiger v. Milford Independent School District, 51 Pa. D. & C. 647
(1944).
24
Id. at 652.
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At least one state legislature has, however, taken a more
liberal view of the rights of students enrolled in state-supported
institutions of higher learning. Oregon has declared the University
of Oregon to be a state agency thereby subjecting it to the Oregon
Procedure Act.25 This Act requires that a proceeding in a state
agency include reasonable notice, right to counsel, compulsory
process, cross-examination, evidentiary limitations, and written findings.26 As one noted commentator observed, "Nothing is lost by
giving the student the chance to confer with a counsellor during
the proceedings if he wishes. His confidence is bolstered and the
committee might be aided."2 Professor Seavey has observed, "It is
shocking that the officials of a state educational institution . . .
should not understand the elementary principles of fair play. It is
equally shocking to find that a court supports them in denying to a
student the protection given to a pickpocket."28

M.

CONCLUSION

It appears as though the law requires only the barest semblance
of procedural due process in college disciplinary proceedings, even
though a student's opportunity to continue his education may be
substantially affected. As exemplified in Dixon, a student may
not be expelled without at least notice and a hearing. Therefore, it
appears that whether or not a student will be allowed to utilize
counsel in a disciplinary hearing will be determined by the particular
practices of the school involved.
Gary Gordon Markham
Larry Andrew Winter

Constitutional Law-Validity of Safety
Helmet Requirements
The State of Michigan amended its motor vehicle code to require all persons operating a motorcycle to "wear a crash helmet
25 ORE. REv. STAT.
26
ORE.I V.STAT.
27

§ 352.010 (1965).
§§ 183.420-470 (1965).
Heyman, Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary Proceedings, 54

CALin.
2 8 L. REv. 73, 79-80 (1966).

Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HAv.L. Rv.1406,
1407 (1957).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1969

5

